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The evolving normative dimensions of “riot”:  
toward an elaborated social identity explanation 
Abstract 
The question of how normative form changes during a riot, and thus how collective behaviour 
spreads to different targets and locations, has been neglected in previous research, despite its 
theoretical and practical importance. We begin to address this limitation through a detailed 
analysis of the rioting in the London borough of Haringey in 2011. A triangulated analysis of 
multiple sources of data (including police reports, media accounts, and videos) finds a pattern of 
behaviour shifting from collective attacks on police targets to looting. A thematic analysis of 41 
interview accounts with participants gathered shortly after the events suggests that a shared anti-
police identity allowed local postcode rivalries to be overcome, forming the basis of empowered 
action not only against the police but to address more long-standing grievances and desires. It is 
argued that collective psychological empowerment operated in a “positive feedback loop”, 
whereby one form of collective self-objectification (and perceived inability of police to respond) 
formed the basis of further action. This analysis of the development of new targets in an 
empowered crowd both confirms and extends the elaborated social identity model as an 
explanation for conflictual intergroup dynamics. 
 
Key words: crowds, social identity, empowerment, collective conflict, 2011 English riots.  
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Introduction 
The “riots” that took place across several English cities in August 2011 displayed two significant 
features. First, there was their geographical spread, initially across London and then to other 
cities in the Midlands and the North West. Second, the riots were marked by behavioural change, 
from anti-police riots to a prevalence of looting and attacks on “wealth”. Both features present 
explanatory challenges. To begin to address these, this paper presents an analysis of the evolving 
social psychological dynamics of the first of the riots that took place across the London borough 
of Haringey in August 2011, which began as an attack upon police but developed into 
widespread looting in nearby shopping centres. Using an extensive corpus of primary and 
secondary sources, we first reconstruct the events and then use participant interviews to analyse 
the social psychological processes underlying them. 
Explaining the 2011 English riots 
The English riots of 2011 were a series of conflicts characterized by both commonality – 
hundreds of people acting collectively – and change – a shift from anti-police activity to looting 
and property damage, both within and across events (Lewis et al., 2011; Metropolitan Police 
Service, 2012). Yet an explanation that captures both of these features is still lacking. Instead, the 
dominant theoretical explanations that have emerged in the research literature have tended to 
focus on either one or the other. Thus, one form of explanation focuses on the looting, which it 
explains as a matter of individuals acting out their neoliberal consumerist identity (e.g., Winlow, 
Hall, Treadwell & Briggs, 2015; Moxon, 2011; Treadwell, Briggs, Winlow, & Hall, 2013). From 
this perspective, the 2011 riots were a nihilistic explosion of frustrations among those denied 
access to the economic and social benefits of capitalism. The assumption is that impoverished 
rioters unanimously acted on consumerist ideology (e.g., the value of branded trainers) but had 
no awareness of, or capability to understand, the class structures that led to their frustrations. As 
such, the riots “contained no core political message for us to decode” (Winlow, et al., p. 140) other than 
they reveal the “ultimate intellectual and political exhaustion of the academic Liberal Left” (ibid; p. 142).     
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The second perspective tends to focus on attacks on police and property, understanding 
them in terms of structurally-driven political protest (e.g., Akram, 2014; Moran & Waddington, 
2015). In this account, the spread of the riots can be understood as a direct expression of 
grievances among the rioters about the illegitimacy of their surrounding social structural 
conditions (e.g., police racism).  
To date, over 130 peer-reviewed journal articles and more than 15 books have been 
written on the events of 2011. Yet only a minority of these are empirical. The largest and most 
extensive research study of the 2011 riots is the Guardian/LSE’s “Reading the Riots”, based on 
270 interviews with rioters carried out soon after the events (Lewis et al., 2011; see Newburn, 
2016a, 2016b; Newburn, Lewis, Addley, & Taylor, 2011; Newburn, Diski et al., 2016). This work 
has provided a rich analysis of the experiences of rioters, showing that, together with collective 
anger, empowerment and joy were evident in actions such as defeating the police (Newburn, 
Deacon et al., 2016). Theoretically, “Reading the Riots” researchers have sought to provide a 
general criminological analysis of cause and consequences in the 2011 English riots; in effect, 
they offer a “grand theory” of riot (e.g., Winlow et al., 2014; Newburn, 2017) rather than an 
account of the specific social psychological dynamics underpinning normative change and spread.  
Other studies that have drawn upon detailed primary empirical evidence have also yet to 
explore how collective behaviour within the riots changed from anti-police conflict into looting 
(e.g., Jeffery & Jackson, 2012). Moreover, those studies drawing upon substantive quantitative 
datasets (such as police arrest and crime figures) do describe shifting patterns in the riots across 
time and location (Baudains, Braithwaite, & Johnson, 2012), but lack an underlying social 
psychological explanation for how these kinds of normative shifts and changes came about. 
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The Social Psychology of Riots 
The elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2009; 
Reicher, 1996, 2001; Stott & Reicher, 1998a) has sought to address a key explanatory problem of 
riots, which is that of how to make sense of both patterns of collective behaviour and changes in 
those patterns. The ESIM has built on Reicher’s (1984) analysis of the limits of crowd behaviour, 
while at the same time seeking to avoid both irrationalism (e.g., Le Bon, 1895/2002; Zimbardo, 
1970) and narrow rationalism (e.g., Berk, 1974; Olson, 1965) in its explanation of patterns and 
change. The model proposes that shared self-categorisation is the psychological basis of the 
norms evident in crowd-based collective action; shared self-categorisation provides definitions of 
appropriate and possible conduct, and so enables crowd participants to act collectively as well as 
defining limits. Given that social identities are intimately linked to their social context (Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), changes in 
relations between groups (e.g., protestors and police) that take place during a crowd event can 
radically alter identities. Based on a body of research on the emergence and escalation of 
collective conflict (e.g., Reicher, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott, Hutchison, & Drury, 2001; 
Stott, Adang, Livingstone, & Schreiber, 2007, 2008; Stott & Reicher, 1998a, 1998b), the ESIM 
suggests that psychological and behavioural change in riots is primarily a matter of social 
repositioning and consequent collective empowerment as group boundaries are re-drawn and 
expectations of support increase (Drury & Reicher, 1999). Such expectations enable the crowd to 
realise (or “objectify”) its identity, which in practice means imposing itself on the outgroup; this 
objectification in turn empowers the crowd further, as it operates as evidence of the tractability 
of opponents and of collective ability to effect “resistance” (Drury & Reicher, 2005). 
Applying the ESIM to normative change 
While the ESIM was developed to explain normative change in crowd events, it has not yet 
addressed some of the kinds of change apparent in the 2011 English riots. First, early work 
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concerned initial emergence of “riot” behaviour from peaceful protest, and the implications for 
policing (e.g., Stott, 2011). The ESIM has been applied to an analysis of the emergence of rioting 
in Tottenham in August 2011 (Stott, Drury, & Reicher, 2017), but that analysis was limited to the 
dynamics of the initial escalations. As such it left the issue of ongoing normative change toward 
looting unaddressed. Second, previous ESIM research on changed aims and empowerment has 
examined the creation of new identities and how these made possible new collective actions 
against outgroups (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000, 2005), but has not examined how those with 
existing anti-police identities change over time, and thus how looting and property damage 
becomes normative. 
Nevertheless, the ESIM can be used as a theoretical framework to derive hypotheses. 
Specifically, the theory would suggest that normative change from police to other targets would 
be a function of variations in intergroup power, and that choice of, and attacks on, new targets 
are shaped and constrained by shared social identity and hence by collective definitions of 
legitimacy.  
For example, in a study of the 1990 “poll tax riot” (Stott & Drury, 2000) it was evident 
that participants’ empowerment enabled them to address an immediate proximal concern, 
namely retaliation against “illegitimate” police action; in other words, police intervention created 
the conditions for “reactive rioting”. What still requires examination, however, is “proactive 
rioting”, meaning extending the action to attacks on other targets that seem to relate to longer-
term grievances (e.g., subsequent attacks on shops in the West End of London appear to be 
attacks on wealth inequality, an attack on the South African Embassy an expression of political 
antagonism toward apartheid).  
The present study 
In this paper, we report a study designed to begin to address this question of normative change 
within riots by using an analysis of the first of the 2011 disturbances that took place in Haringey 
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in north London on the evening of the 6th and morning of the 7th August (see Figure 1). We 
have chosen this riot for several reasons. First, there is the social significance - this was the first 
of what became the biggest wave of urban riots in the UK for 30 years; it was the catalyst from 
which the other riots subsequently developed across the next four days (Lewis et al., 2011). 
Second, this event exhibited clear prima facie evidence of normative change as well as escalation 
(Reicher & Stott, 2011; Stott et al., 2017). The event developed from a peaceful protest outside 
Tottenham police station to violent conflict between crowd and police to widespread looting in 
two shopping centres located some distance away. Third, the present study has been made 
possible because of the quantity and quality of data we have available, including 41 interview 
accounts obtained from a large sample of people directly involved, and an extensive corpus of 
secondary sources. 
---Insert Figure 1 about here--- 
The interviews were obtained as part of the “Reading the Riots” study in the months 
immediately following the disturbances (Lewis et al., 2011). This data was supplemented by a 
body of additional evidence we have used to build a triangulated account of the Haringey riot 
across time and geographical location. We use this data to provide an objective account of the 
nature of the riot and then cross-reference chronology with the interview transcripts to 
document and analyse participants’ shared definitions of self and other as they developed. On 
this basis, we examine the subjective accounts of participants with interest in references to 
identity, intergroup relationships, power and empowerment, and relate these to ongoing social 
relations, targets, and patterns of participation. In summary, therefore, our overall aim in this 
study was to explain how looting and attacks on property emerged from an anti-police riot, and 
how these became collective. As part of this, we sought to provide the first highly detailed 
account of the events in question. 
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Methods 
The analysis is in two parts, each employing different methods and drawing on a range of 
sources. 
Triangulated Account  
The triangulated account provides a consensual description of the broad parameters and salient 
features of the disturbances in the London borough of Haringey over the night of 6th-7th August 
2011 that are relevant to the subsequent analysis. The methodological approach used to generate 
this account is that of triangulation (cf. Denzin, 1970) to substantiate the veracity of the timing, 
location and content of an incident within an event. There are three types of information that 
make up the triangle: evidence of the actions of the crowd, real-time media recorded during the 
events and post hoc accounts by participants and eyewitnesses. Through cross-referencing these 
forms of evidence and making reasoned assessments of the quantity and quality of the sources, a 
level of confidence can be determined that an incident occurred and when and where it 
happened.  
 Using this approach, a timeline of events for the disturbances was created and from this, 
a comprehensive narrative account was written. An initial timeline was constructed from existing 
post-event accounts (Metropolitan Police Service [MPS], 2012; Reicher & Stott, 2011; Stott et al., 
2017) and then populated and cross-referenced with ~200 items of evidence. These included 
government and independent reports, academic publications, and written accounts in local and 
national media. Sixty online videos, along with numerous photographic sources, were cross-
referenced using Google Street View and other sources to determine locations and timings. 
Timelines and real-time reporting on blogs created during and after the unrest, and 
contemporaneous Twitter messages, provided additional temporal and spatial evidence. These 
sources were cross-referenced with comprehensive data on sites, times and types of crimes 
related to the disorders in Haringey provided by the MPS. Most participant testimonies came 
from 41 interviews collected as part of the Guardian/LSE Reading the Riots project. Other 
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eyewitness accounts, including those of police officers, were found in official reports, 
newspapers, and the academic literature. A full list of sources is provided in the Supporting 
Information. 
Psychological Account 
The interviews were undertaken by researchers recruited by the Guardian/LSE and completed 
within three months of the riots (Lewis et al., 2011). Each researcher utilised existing local 
contacts to trace people who had been involved in the riots, the clear majority of whom had not 
at that point been arrested. Of all those interviewed by the “Reading the Riots study”, 30% were 
recorded as aged 10-17 and a further 49% aged 18-24. In relation to other demographic 
characteristics the sample closely matched the data reported by the Ministry of Justice for those 
appearing in court for riot-related offences. Thus, where ethnicity was recorded approximately 
37% were white, 40% were black and 6% Asian; roughly 20% were female; around, 59% of 
rioters came from the most deprived 20% of areas in the UK with 68% of the interviewees 
admitting to having a prior conviction3.  Interviews were conducted in various locations, such as 
people's own homes, youth clubs, cafes, and fast-food restaurants. They were semi-structured; 
each researcher was asked to find out how people first heard about the riots, how they became 
involved, how they communicated, what they did, why they thought the riots stopped, and how 
they felt about their actions now. Each interview lasted on average approximately 45 minutes. 
The transcripts were all redacted to remove identifying information and then coded 
based on the geographical and temporal events that the individual reported being involved in. Of 
the full dataset (210 transcripts), 41 were found to be with people involved in the rioting or 
looting that took place variously on Tottenham High Road (n = 39), Tottenham Hale (n = 13) 
and Wood Green (n = 8) in Haringey. A random sample of 10 of these transcripts were then 
read by the first author and a preliminary theoretically-driven thematic analysis conducted (based 
on principles outlined in Braun & Clarke, 2006). An initial sample of three transcripts based on a 
judgement concerning their theoretical relevance were passed to the rest of the team, and then 
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read in depth and coded by four of these researchers independently of one another. The research 
team then convened, discussed and refined the initial themes. The first author then read all 41 
transcripts and analysed these in terms of all points of interest in relation to the research 
question: specifically, could we observe evidence of processes that help explain the spread and 
normative change? 
The psychological analysis drew upon the triangulated account to provide a chronological 
ordering. This was achieved by organising statements within each transcript relevant to key 
moments in the ongoing evolution of the events. The analysis sought to identify evidence within 
the post-hoc accounts of processes that may have been operating during these key moments.  At 
certain times and locations only a few of our participants were present. As such, we have 
assumed that where a theme is present in our sample it is evidence that a form of social 
psychology may have been at work at the time among sections of the crowd. Nonetheless we 
have also looked for disconfirming cases (Potter, 1996; e.g., instances where participants spoke 
of a lack of identity in the crowd, a lack of empowerment, differences within the crowd over 
normative conduct, or cite idiosyncratic explanations for their behaviour). Finally, the themes 
were used to revisit the transcripts and where relevant to quantify the extent to which they were 
present across the sample. An inter-rater reliability test carried out with 10% of the material 
suggested that the coding was consistent, Cohen’s κ = .76. 
Triangulated Account 
What follows is a summary of the disturbances in Haringey on 6th-7th August 2011. The fully 
referenced, comprehensive account is provided in the Supporting Information. The death of 
Mark Duggan, a 29-year-old Black male resident of Haringey, through the actions of an MPS 
firearms team on Thursday 4th August, 2011 in Tottenham Hale (Independent Police Complaints 
Commission [IPCC], 2015a), and the events that occurred over the two days after Mr Duggan’s 
death, have been well-documented (IPCC, 2015b; MPS, 2012). The following account 
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concentrates on the chain of incidents that occurred after the decision was made to stage a 
protest at Tottenham Police station in the late afternoon of Saturday 6th. 
The emergence of conflict 
Most accounts suggest that the point at which the protest outside Tottenham police station 
began to escalate into disorder coincided with the end of negotiations between protestors and 
police at around 20:30. In fact, more than an hour earlier, at around 19:00, two police cars 
parked nearby on Forster Road (Location 3, Figure 2) were vandalised and a resident journalist 
filming the scene was subsequently assaulted. However, barring a couple of missiles launched at 
the police station over the next hour (19:15-20:15) the situation remained tense but generally free 
from collective violence, the first of several lulls during the disturbance. 
---Insert Figure 2 about here--- 
At approximately 20:20, the Duggan family group aborted their negotiations with the police and 
left the scene. Almost immediately, one of the vandalised police cars was pushed into the centre 
of the High Road and set alight. The second car followed a short time after. These actions and 
the throwing of missiles led the MPS to deploy a Territorial Support Group1 (TSG) unit in full 
public order equipment outside the police station to create a “sterile area”. This provided 
defence for the police station and split the gathering crowd on the High Road into two groups, 
the larger to the north and another smaller group to the south. Even though missiles were 
sporadically launched at the cordon, this period (20:30-21:10) was effectively a second lull as the 
police, awaiting public-order trained reinforcements, lacked the numbers to respond, and crowd 
participants appeared reluctant to engage directly.  
At 21:10, a second TSG unit arrived, deploying alongside their colleagues at the cordon 
to the north of the police station. Although instructed to “hold the line”, the inspector in charge 
of the second unit took a more aggressive approach, ordering short shield advances to “distance 
the attackers who were throwing missiles at police and to prevent them from ‘settling’ in their 
positions” (MPS, 2011 p. 43). It was during this period of rapid advances and retreats by the 
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TSG units, after dusk at around 21:30, that police knocked to the ground a young woman who 
approached the cordon. Following this incident there was a rapid escalation of collective 
violence. Angrily citing the “beating of the girl”, a body of protesters advanced down the High 
Road past the burning police vehicles and charged at the police cordon, launching a volley of 
missiles. 
The emergence of arson and looting 
For the next hour on the High Road to the north of the police station, participants took bottles 
and broke up pallets from the front of shops to throw at the police cordon. Others wheeled 
refuse bins towards the police lines and made rudimentary firebombs. Whilst most were 
spectating or fighting the police, small groups of youths attempted to rob a nearby takeaway 
shop and an amusement arcade. Members of the crowd intervened and then encouraged other 
businesses to close. The volume and ferocity of the missile attacks on the two TSG units led 
them to cease making short shield advances. At 22:10 they withdrew towards the police station 
forming a single line cordon, holding their position and awaiting reinforcements. 
Thirty minutes later, around 22:40, the first building was set alight, a solicitors’ office 
(Location 5, Figure 2) 50m north of the now smouldering police cars. At about the same time, 
100m further north at the High Road-Brook Road junction (Location 6, Figure 2) a double-
decker bus was commandeered and set on fire – images of the rapidly burning bus were 
broadcast live by several TV news crews that were now near the police station.  
 Around 23:15 in Bruce Grove – beyond the burning bus and out of direct line of site of 
the police station – several groups began looting shops. These included a supermarket, 
bookmakers, jewellers, and a post office, with the latter two targets set on fire shortly after. Two 
nearby banks had their windows smashed and there was also an attempt to burn one of these 
properties (Location 7, Figure 2). 
 It wasn’t until 23:30, more than three hours after the outbreak of serious violence, that 
enough public order trained reinforcements and mounted officers were gathered at Tottenham 
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police station to allow the police to go on the offensive by trying to disperse the crowd. For the 
next six hours, these reinforcements fought a series of staggered pitched battles at burning 
barricades for more than a mile north along the High Road towards White Hart Lane. The 
violence was almost exclusively directed at the police. There was significant looting of 
businesses, but a large proportion of this was undertaken to acquire material for barricades and 
missiles. Also, during the same period, a neighbourhood police station, supermarket, building 
site, local council offices, carpet store, jobcentre and recruitment office were selected for arson 
out of numerous potential targets.2 The violence was eventually curtailed by a combination of the 
aggressive use of police helicopters and armoured vehicles, exhaustion and depletion of the 
rioters, and the approach of daylight. Although the battles on the High Road north of 
Tottenham police station continued until dawn, several rioters disengaged and travelled to other 
locations to take part in looting.  
Tottenham Hale 
From about 23:30, members of the crowd south of the cordon on the High Road began to 
attack police carriers that were arriving at Tottenham police station. This action escalated over 
the next two hours, until at about 01:30 an abandoned police car parked at the junction of the 
High Road and Monument Way (Location 14, Figure 2) was wrecked and set alight. Journalists 
from Sky and the BBC who had been mingling amongst the crowd outside the police cordon for 
several hours were assaulted and their satellite van was attacked with missiles and forced to drive 
off.  
 A large part of this crowd then moved off along Monument Way heading towards 
Tottenham Hale Retail Park, less than half a mile away to the east (Location 16, Figure 2). By 
02:00 several hundred people were looting several large shops in the complex with apparent 
impunity. Messages describing the uncontested looting in the retail park passed via Blackberry 
Messenger (BBM) into the social media arena attracting more people, some of whom began 
arriving in vehicles. For around four hours, hundreds of people took clothes, shoes, and 
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electronic goods from major chain stores. It wasn’t until dawn that the first police units began to 
arrive in the retail park, chasing and arresting the few remaining looters who were scouring the 
ransacked shops. 
Wood Green 
By 02:00 many to the north of the police station were gathered at the junction of Lordship Lane 
and Lansdowne Road (Location 15, Figure 2) and were becoming aware through BBM that 
Tottenham Hale retail park was being looted by hundreds of people without resistance. The 
direct route to Wood Green shopping centre, a mile and a half to the west, was via Lordship 
Lane, presenting a straightforward choice; continue fighting the police on the High Road or head 
to Wood Green. Around 03:00 this decision was effectively made for the remaining rioters by 
the actions of police when mounted and foot units seized the junction. The crowd was split into 
two groups by the police advance, one withdrawing west along Lordship Lane towards Wood 
Green, and the other retreating north along the High Road to continue the fight. 
 The disturbance in Wood Green occurred in two phases. The first, which began around 
midnight,3 was registered by the MPS, but due to the urgent need to deploy all available police 
resources to the High Road, these reports were all but ignored. Dissemination by mobile phone 
of text descriptions and crucially images, proving the veracity of the first phase in Wood Green, 
helped generate a much more significant period of looting. Beginning at around 03:00 and lasting 
for more than six hours, the second phase was marked by apparently calm, systematic and often 
organised theft by hundreds of people of major stores on the High Road (Location 26, Figure 3). 
The targets of the looters were major retail chains ranging from those selling sportswear, mobile 
phones, and electronic goods to beauty products, health foods, and computer games. The arrival 
of the first police units at dawn led to several arrests, though sporadic looting continued for 
several hours until approximately 09:45 in the morning. 
---Insert Figure 3 about here--- 
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Analysis of interview data 
The triangulated account suggests the following issues require explanation. First, what was the 
relationship (if any) between initial crowd activities and shared identity in the crowd? Within this, 
how did people define themselves and their intergroup context in relation to the events? Second, 
psychologically, how did conflict become seen as legitimate and possible? Third, how did 
participants experience the developing conflict with police? To what extent was the experience 
one of empowerment? Fourth and finally, building on these issues, how did looting come to be 
understood as appropriate and possible in this context of what was initially an anti-police riot 
and to what extent did the looting reflect individualistic motivations versus collective 
understandings of appropriate conduct? The following thematic analysis orients to these 
questions. Extracts presented below were chosen for their efficiency of expression and 
representativeness of other quotes and themes within the dataset.  
Approaching the protest: “us” and “them”. 
While all participants describe being aware of the shooting of Mark Duggan, some articulate its 
significance emerging because he was known to them and not seen as a legitimate target: 
[At first] I didn’t think nothing of it, just another guy, but when I found 
out who it was, cos I know ’im innit. ‘Cos his family’s, one of them big 
guys, so obviously, I knew he wasn’t doing nothing wrong, he was coming 
back from party or something like that. (LON2710114309:7-10)4 
Some 27 people (66%) in our sample described an intergroup context prior to the shooting 
whereby they or others like them were habitually subjected to illegitimate police stop and search5, 
leading to a sense of resentment and antagonism: 
Q: How do you think people had got to that point of not caring? 
A: Sometimes...6 you know when something happens to you over and over 
again, like say I get arrested yeah, over and over again, and I get stopped 
and searched over and over again, and the police like keep trying to pick 
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on me over and over again say cos I’m black, and I’m young... you just get 
to a point where you’re fed up and can’t take it no more... 
(LON2110110827:302-306) 
Thus, participants suggest that what had happened to Mark Duggan was emblematic of a wider 
collective relationship between the community and the police: 
A: I didn’t know him, but people I know did. So therefore, he’s my 
bredren [brother]. It’s just the way he died... sort of weird. If you have the 
balls to do it, do it then explain to his friends, you can’t just say one thing 
and then another... so I just thought, “you know what? Look what they’re 
doing to me, look what they did to him.” (LON2210110829:239 - 242) 
Thus, 32 interviewees (78%) described the shooting as a contributing factor to their involvement 
and that of others. The shooting appeared to operate as a way of defining identity in terms of a 
historical continuation of illegitimate, sometimes fatal, encounters with police. Other specific 
incidents referred to by participants were the shooting of Brazilian national Jean Charles de 
Menezes in 2005 and the Black British reggae singer Smiley Culture who had died during a police 
raid approximately five months prior to the riot:  
‘Cos look, look. Even the other day that Smiley Culture died in Brixton. 
They [police] trying to say he stabbed himself in the chest while he was 
cuffed. How’s stuff like that happening? And they just keep getting away 
with it. They are just getting away with it. (LON1010111501:419 – 422) 
Nonetheless, 25 respondents (61%) also pointed to other structural grievances such as economic 
inequality and denial of employment opportunities brought about primarily by the legislative 
actions of the then coalition government (e.g., raised university tuition fees and the scrapping of 
educational benefits for young people) as reasons for their participation. 
 17 
Escalation: norms and limits.  
Ten participants (24%) were present at the protest. Another 20 (49%) joined the crowd on the 
High Road after collective confrontation had developed.  Those that were present portray 
“bystanders” explicitly supporting confrontation against police targets: 
And, um, all the crowds around were really supporting them. And were 
there, not only to, observe, but they were supporting them, actively 
supporting them in some way. [ ]7 Like, I saw people going to pick up 
bricks that had fallen and passing them back. Um, so the people were 
involved at all sorts of levels... in my experience. (LON0111110701:105-
109)   
Moreover, 26 participants (63%) described attacks on police targets in a positive manner, with 
many claiming it as a collective reaction to their historical antagonisms with the police, defining a 
sense of “us” among people in the borough and none described these attacks in a negative way: 
A: I wasn’t really shocked, but then again. 
Q: Why weren’t you shocked? 
A: Cos it’s Tottenham like, it’s just, it’s bound to happen someday, it was 
bound to happen where the feds [police] were like, piss us off to the max 
where we just have to take it into our own hands and they couldn’t do 
nuttin [nothing] about it so I just knew summit [something] like this would 
happen one day, I just didn’t know when, but it didn’t really shock me. 
(LON2710114309:107-113) 
For some time in the face of these sporadic attacks, the approximately 55 officers outside the 
station did little else other than hold the small area of roadway, while they waited for 
reinforcements. In relation to this phase of the escalation, 25 participants (61%) described their 
surprise that police were not being more assertive in the face of obvious criminality: 
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They were all, they were just doing nothing. They were all standing outside 
the police station all lined up along the street and they weren’t doing 
nothing whatsoever. They were just standing there. Even though the two 
cars, they’d already been fucked, the police still didn’t do nothing 
(LON0410111301:183-186) 
The targets of collective confrontation during these early stages included an arson attack against 
a bus and some looting of shops. The attack on the bus is important, in that it signals the first 
normative shift toward non-police targets by rioters; 19 participants (46%) were explicit that they 
disagreed with these kinds of attacks. Some described them as relatively meaningless: 
A: I saw that, and they put a bus on fire I think, bare [lots of] things on 
fire 
Q: And what did, what did they say to you when they set it on fire? 
A: Well obviously I didn’t wanna get involved in that sorta ting [thing], I’m 
not gonna get arrested for stupid things, so I wasn’t really paying attention 
to it… There’s no real sense of why they did it, they just did it. 
(LON2710114309:48-58) 
Other participants also described limits to such behaviour, even for those actions some saw as 
anti-normative. For example, one participant describes how the arsonists actively sought to 
minimise the impact of their attack on members of the public: 
My friend was on the bus as well. He was saying how the guys who did it 
come on the bus first to warn everyone to come off the bus, we’re setting 
the bus on fire. I think that’s good because at least they warned the people 
there first (LON0610111001:425-427) 
Others describe how they actively tried to prevent attacks on private property: 
Them things, I played no part in at all. I didn’t respect that, when they’re 
burning down people’s shops and houses and that. That’s where people 
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live. They ain’t done nothing to man so I didn’t rate that. And I made sure 
people around me that was lighting them. If you lot light them things I’m 
not no arson t’ing [thing] man. I’m not no arsonist. I’m not burning down 
houses for no reason (LON1010111501:296–301) 
Convergence, shared identity and empowerment 
At around 22.40, as police reinforcements began to force rioters on the High Road north, 
participants from further afield – areas to the north such as Edmonton, Hackney and Wood 
Green – describe how they began to converge into the area, many through the railway station at 
Bruce Grove. Some arriving at this stage would not normally venture onto the High Road 
because of intense intergroup antagonism between youths from different neighbourhoods, often 
referred to as postcode rivalries. It is also evident that many had also not previously experienced 
a riot, and as such the situation was highly novel. Fifteen accounts (37%) describe an experience 
which was initially one of vulnerability - not from the police, but from the others within the 
crowd: 
Well from the police car going on fire to the point where buses on fire and 
building on fire, I’m sort of thinking, it’s not even safe to be outside, 
because anyone can do anything to you. A couple of people got stabbed 
that night, I think, a couple of people got stabbed... anything could 
happen, cos if they were putting buildings on fire and the police ain’t 
doing nothing, then anyone could of stole, stabbed someone, killed 
someone and the police don’t care. (LON2710114309:147-151) 
Nonetheless, the shared antagonism toward the police appears to have allowed a sense of 
collective identity to be recognised that served to supersede these prior hostilities. This sense of 
common identity was described not merely as a reaction to police action in the proximal context 
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of the crowd, but as a consequence of their shared historical day-to-day experiences of 
illegitimate policing: 
Q. Did you see people that you knew there? 
A. Yeah. Some people that I didn’t really speak to – ‘cause we’re on 
opposite postcodes. But it didn’t really matter.  
Q. Why did it not matter? 
A. Coz it’s the lesser of two evils. 
Q. What do you mean? 
A. The police are the biggest crime ever.  It doesn’t matter where you’re 
from anymore. So, who’s the greater evil? Your enemy’s enemy? Your 
friends. (LON1510114302:87-99) 
Just over half (54%) of our sample of 41 participants describe an emergent and collective 
experience within the crowd of comradery, friendly interaction, sharing and solidarity in place of 
the prior antagonisms: 
Half the people who did the riots weren’t even from our area. They come 
to help us. I mean if it was a gang wise, why are people from like Hackney 
coming down to Tottenham to help us? If it was to do with gangs 
wouldn’t we be trying to hurt them? They’d be trying to hurt us. It wasn’t 
like that. They all come down to Tottenham to try to help us. 
(LON0610111001:531–535)   
This emergent identity appears to have empowered participants, enabling them to do more than 
could be achieved in isolation: 
Because, like, maybe they were thinking if we just do it as groups it’s not 
really going to work. If we all come as one, then it will make us bigger and 
stronger… So, it’s like stand up for your community. 
(LON0111110702:134-137) 
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One participant recalled his experiences at around this time and location, describing how he 
began to organise and exert leadership within this newly realised social group;  
When the altercations began between the police and the group it was clear 
there was no leadership amongst us, the group. So obviously being who I 
am and knowing what I know, I assumed control of the group and told 
them, you know, how to get things done… We started turning stuff over 
in the middle of the road so that if they [the police] wanted to follow us… 
They’d have to come on foot and fight us fairly… So obviously, I had to 
stress to the other ones if you separate and go by yourself the police will 
pick you up individually, as a group we are strong and individually you’ll 
be arrested. (LON0610111901:138–160)   
The data also suggests that the expression and realisation of this emergent identity, in the form 
of confrontational actions, was marked by a shift in collective emotions away from merely anger 
toward joy, pride, and celebration. Such positive emotions were described by 19 interviewees 
(46%): 
It was celebratory, it was like, a lot of pride. Everyone was together. Apart 
from the burning and stuff, other than that, youths coming together that 
was one of the biggest things. ‘Cos I’ve never seen so many youths come 
together and have no problems with each other and just have a certain 
problem on the police because of what the police did. 
(LON0610111803:100–104) 
Agency and change: looting as an emergent possibility. 
In this rapidly evolving intergroup context, some participants described how they expected to be 
contained (or “kettled”) by the police:  
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The funny thing is that, I think a lot of people that had been in 
confrontation with the police before expected them to bring 
reinforcements down, either Bruce Grove or down north, down the High 
Road. So as to encircle us, if you like. Force us to disperse down the street, 
or practically kettle us. So, we were always looking for, we needed to stand 
somewhere so that we could have an exit. But it didn’t come, it never 
came to that, not at all. (LON0111110701:169-174) 
While it appears that police units did attempt such an intervention, the ferocity of the violence 
from the crowd prevented it. In this context, participants describe a reversal of the day-to-day 
disempowerment they felt historically in relation to the police. Twenty-three interviewees (56%) 
referred to a sense of community engendered in that context of relative empowerment, either 
during or after the event: 
A: Then we had them under control. We had them under manners 
[control] for once. They never had us under manner. We had them on the 
lock. On smash. Running away from us. We weren’t running from the 
police. They were the criminals today. We was enforcing the law. Getting 
them out of our town because they aren’t doing nothing good anyway for 
no one. 
Q: What did it feel like? That was the feeling amongst people there? 
A: That was the first time I can say I felt like I’d be among a proper 
community. (LON1010111501:200–208) 
While there was some looting of shops in and around Bruce Grove, this is described by some 
primarily to gather ammunition to further attack the police: 
Q: And did you do anything else while you were there? 
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A: Well, we did the shops, but not really shops like JD to loot stuff and 
take different garments, just most people was rioting to get weapons and 
that. 
Q:  For the police? 
A: Yeah. (LON1510111704:92-96) 
While looting was said by some to be a way of gaining means to attack the police, looting was 
also described as an activity that became possible because of perceived police weakness. Sixteen 
participants (39%) referred to the capacity to loot these shops and engage in targeted arson 
attacks as further evidence of their collective agency and the consequential opportunities they 
now had available: 
Cos like when that happened and they saw the police weren’t doing 
nothing, that was when everyone started to come out and think this is the 
time to loot like Tottenham retail park, some jewellery shops. 
(LON2710114309:39-42) 
Sixteen participants (39%) described an awareness of relative capability to act collectively in a 
context of decreasing capability of police to prevent them. Only one respondent (2%) described 
feeling disempowered in this context. In other words, in the context of the riot, identity-based 
collective action may have further exposed the disempowerment of police which in turn 
enhanced the sense of empowerment among the rioters in an ongoing, or historical, intergroup 
process: 
Q. Right... If someone wasn't there, and you're trying to say, like, if there 
was so many police, how was it that you could kind of get away with 
anything? What was the impression that you got? What was the impression 
that people got that made them feel like, yo, we can just do whatever we 
feel like?   
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A. Cos I think they started attacking the police, and when they saw the 
police was backing off they thought yeah we've gained the upper hand, we 
can actually do whatever we want cos we're bigger than the police. 
(LON0610111403:154-162)  
Moreover, by now there were others who described not being involved in the rioting but hearing 
about the emerging opportunities that were occurring as a function of it: 
A: Well, I didn’t go to like the riot and stuff. But I got another phone call 
from a friend saying people are meeting, and there’s a shopping park just 
next to Tottenham and he was like “police aren’t there”. So, I saw it as an 
opportunity and I told him I would come and meet him. I went down 
there and started taking as much stuff as I could. (LON2910110844:25–
28) 
Some participants in the riot also described others moving from the crowd, and from elsewhere, 
toward the now police-free area of Tottenham Hale, where several large retailers began to be 
systematically looted: 
They were going through the back roads and people were saying “Oh 
Tottenham Hale’s unguarded” and, which kind of just went off point for 
me, because I was there for the police and the confrontation with them, 
was my interest, because they, to vent some frustration out on them, and 
how I feel they deal with us in general. That’s why I was there. But 
obviously, people saw alternative motives. They went their separate ways 
type thing. (LON0111110703:89-94) 
Indeed, one participant in the crowd on the High Road describes how, once the significant 
looting began in Tottenham Hale, he became aware that the police were not intervening to 
prevent it. This appears to have further enhanced his sense of collective agency and short-term 
opportunity: 
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Q: Then you, and then, at what point did it start to become… 
A: More the looting? 
Q: More the looting. 
A: When people went to Ferry Lane. When we see [on social media], 
people going to Ferry Lane and they are not getting caught for it. The 
police are not there, the police are occupied with the rioters. When you see 
people looting and no one, the police aren’t doing anything about it. 
They’re not responding to situations like. If we go there and they are not 
doing anything what is stopping us from going to Wood Green. They are 
very slow to react so we have got to take this opportunity. 
(LON2910110843:181-192)   
As the police dispersal pushed the crowd further north, Wood Green shopping centre was less 
than three kilometres to the West. Fourteen participants (34%) described their involvement in 
the looting, arson or criminal damage as an expression of power over the police. One interviewee 
explains how they experienced and enacted their evolving motivations, realising the vulnerability 
of the retail outlets in Wood Green though their capacity to initiate looting on the High Road: 
A: Personally, I didn’t plan to rob anything. But we were just there and we 
were provoking the police, if you want to put it like that, we were 
provoking the police. We weren’t really stealing anything. But then I saw a 
few people go attack local shops, stealing stuff, and because we were, the 
police couldn’t get to us, so it was like, it was easy to steal from there. 
Q: And where was that? 
A: Do you know Bruce Grove [ ] near the station, the bridge, off licence 
there, a few Turkish shops. 
Q: Oh, yeah, yeah. 
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A: Off license there, we took a few things and someone came up with the 
idea, like, if we spread this, could the police, like control it? [ ]  
Q: Specifically, the idea of spreading it came up. How did you spread it? 
A: What was done was, I called as many people as I could. “Oh I hear like, 
everyone’s gonna go to like Wood Green”, so, call as many people as you 
can go to Wood Green and we’ll all go down there (LON2910110843:10–
33)    
As the rioting on the High Road continued, the police had little ability to react to incidents 
developing elsewhere. The participant describes realising the opportunity that these transformed 
intergroup relations and sense of collective agency afforded: 
A: From there till [Wood] Green, a whole bunch of us walking to Green, 
could tell something was gonna happen. It was like, I wouldn’t say we was 
all friends, but at that time we was all friends. We had one motive, that 
was to get as many things as we can and sell it on, well, personally sell it 
on. So we got down to Wood Green, and then got down to a few phone 
shops. Anywhere you could make the most money. The phone shop next 
to JD [Sports] got ripped apart. (LON2910110843:38–42] 
Once in Wood Green, self-organisation combined with the absence of police allowed these 
groups to begin collectively looting the shops. As one participant involved in the looting in 
Wood Green describes, their participation was experienced in positive and collective terms: 
A: You know what? Out of all of the whole thing, like, I saw communities 
coming together [laughs]. I know it’s a bad thing, for like, everyone but at 
the end of the day I saw the community coming together.  
Q: How so?  
A: Because like, usually, cos it’s postcode gangs and that lot, like Hornsey, 
they have differences with Wood Green. But then again, when the riots 
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came, I saw Wood Green and Hornsey people just walking past each other 
like it was nothing like “oh help me with this”, and “you will get some of 
this” and just “help me out” and that’s just. It brought people together 
because, now, it’s like I don’t see a problem with any kind of area. 
(LON1210110402:451-460) 
Moreover, for some the systematic looting was socially meaningful. Twelve respondents (29%) 
described it as a form of collective action that simultaneously offered financial gain and 
confronted the “establishment”.  
Discussion 
Previous social psychological research has explained collective looting and attacks on property 
during riots as the acting out of pre-given desires or identities (Berk & Aldrich, 1972; Reicher, 
1984) or has simply noted the emergence of these behaviours in the “natural-history” of a riot 
without adequately explaining them (e.g., Reicher & Stott, 2011; Stott & Drury, 2000). This study 
has moved beyond these previous accounts in three ways. First, it provided an analysis of the 
change in norms in the first of the 2011 riots, from anti-police collective action to looting and 
attacks on property. Second, it provided detailed evidence on the social psychological dynamics 
of that normative change. Third, to the extent that the nature of change in the Haringey events 
was different than in other dynamic conflictual events to which the ESIM has been applied, we 
aimed to show that ESIM principles can be developed to explain this different kind of transition.  
The analysis comprised, first, the most detailed anatomy of the Haringey events yet 
produced. This triangulated account confirms that the initial escalation of collective conflict took 
place following police intervention into the crowd on Tottenham High Road (Stott et al., 2017). 
When this first intensification developed, it was evidently an “anti-police riot” in the first 
instance. While there were attacks on non-police targets in the early phase, the major change in 
normative action toward systematic looting developed some hours later and followed a complex 
pattern of historical (i.e., occurred across time) intergroup interaction, conflict and convergence.  
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The data suggests a series of social psychological factors were involved. First, the 
shooting of Mark Duggan occurred in a context of perceived structural illegitimacy, defined by 
our participants in terms of longstanding antagonisms and disempowerment regarding the police 
and other powerful actors. This structural context appears to have positioned Mark Duggan’s 
death as identity-relevant. In other words, the fatality was meaningful because it was symbolic of 
ongoing illegitimacy of the intergroup context. Following the breakdown of communications 
between the police and Mark Duggan’s family, a series of attacks were initiated upon police 
targets by some within the crowd and the situation became increasingly polarised.  
 Second, the sense of structural illegitimacy appears to have been further compounded 
when police reinforcements undertook their initial forceful interventions into the crowd. This 
escalation seems to have revolved around perceptions of the indiscriminate police use of force 
against a young “girl”, an incident that appears to have transformed what were piecemeal 
sporadic attacks into a concerted collective confrontation, driving police back and forcing them 
to wait for further reinforcements. This retreat and subsequent reticence on behalf of the police 
appears to be associated with an early and emergent sense of empowerment among participants 
that corresponds with the first normative transition to non-police targets. Nonetheless, at this 
stage, many of our participants either describe some of these attacks as an extension of anti-
police rioting, witnessed others actively intervening, or appear to have sought to limit their 
spread and impact (Stott et al., 2017).  
Third, as the event progressed, it is apparent that increasing numbers of police and 
crowd participants converged on to the High Road. Some participants consequently began to 
recognise potential threats from others around them with whom they were historically involved 
in hostile intergroup or “postcode” conflicts. However, the shared historical experiences of 
antagonism with police appears to have afforded an opportunity for these participants to share a 
common identity in that specific and unique context of police disempowerment. This emergent 
shared self-categorisation seems to have provided an increasing capacity for coordinated 
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collective action and organisation within the crowd. As the police reinforcements began their 
dispersal north and south, the increased capacity of rioters to objectify their new social identity 
through “proactive” collective confrontation enabled them to further realise their increasing 
power to temporarily reverse their historical subjugation.  
 As ESIM would predict, there is evidence that the shift in power relations corresponded 
with a change in emotion from collective anger to joy. This also seems to be related to a new 
sense of collective agency. Indeed, evidently the two appear connected. Just as disempowerment 
in relation to an antagonistic outgroup feels aversive, so a new sense of agency in relation to the 
same outgroup feels exhilarating (Drury & Reicher, 2005).  
Given their relative empowerment, some began to describe their capability to extend the 
riot by collectively attacking and looting the nearby retail parks. The first collective target was 
Tottenham Hale. As participants in the riot to the north describe becoming aware, partly via 
social media, of the fact that this looting was taking place unopposed, some understood the 
opportunities that Wood Green afforded. They describe utilising their emergent collective 
agency to mobilize toward the area, a decision made easier by social media and the fact that the 
police dispersal effectively drove some of the rioters in that direction. Moreover, once within 
Wood Green, many of the looters in our sample describe being able to work collaboratively as a 
group to break into and appropriate goods from predominantly large corporate retailers.  
 The analysis therefore supports our contention that the processes of normative change 
observed during the riot were underpinned by intergroup and identity-based processes of 
empowerment in a manner that is consistent with ESIM. First, there was an “anti-police” identity 
that was widely shared and gave meaning to police action and shaped collective (re)action. 
Second, the choice of and attacks on targets appear to have been shaped and constrained by this 
shared social identity and hence by wider definitions of legitimacy.  
 The drivers of collective action subsequently appeared to change, and the event went 
beyond a reactive riot toward proactive rioting against targets that seem to relate to longer term 
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structural grievances (e.g., wealth inequality, antagonism toward the “establishment”). It is our 
contention that this normative transformation corresponded with a subjective sense of collective 
agency that emerged over time directly from the ongoing identity-based intergroup dynamics of 
the anti-police riot on the High Road. Therefore, the other novel contribution of the present 
analysis is to show how the intergroup dynamics of empowerment may operate as a self-
reinforcing cycle of positive feedback, depending on outgroup reactions (or lack of them). In the 
present account, collective self-objectification is shown to be not simply a process of identity-
assertion over the antagonistic other but also actions against the other that provide the 
conditions for subsequent identity-enactment. 
Thus, we suggest that the initial interactions and shared identity enabled those within the crowd 
on the High Road to objectify their shared anti-police identity. Second, the effects of this 
collective self-objectification – the impact on the street and on the police – operated both as 
evidence of a collective ability to effect resistance but also of the tractability of their opponents 
(Drury & Reicher, 2005). This ongoing combination of social identity, collective action, 
intergroup interaction, and dynamic power relations ultimately culminated in some participants 
realising their collective agency to mobilise into new locations to attack wealth and loot from 
corporate retailers.   
 Riots are difficult things to study because of their complexity and their illegality. To meet 
this challenge, we drew together a range of secondary data from independent sources and 
perspectives. Where possible we cross-referenced these sources with “hard” evidence such as 
contemporaneous video footage and crime reports. However, there are still dangers; specific 
incidents (e.g., an attack on a bus) may be initiated by one or two people and misunderstood by 
the observer as reflective of crowd norms. In other words, there is a danger of homogenising the 
crowd and its motivations based upon the actions of individuals or small groups (Hussain & 
Bagguley, 2009; cf. Turner & Killian, 1972). Equally, in constructing an anatomy of a riot there is 
a danger of incorrectly assuming underlying causality where specific incidents preceded or appear 
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related to others. Moreover, it may also be the case that we have missed specific incidents. 
Nonetheless, the quantity and quality of evidence we have drawn together has allowed us to be 
reasonably confident that we have developed the most accurate and detailed account of what 
took place in Haringey in a manner that objectively identifies the patterns of collective action as 
relevant to the specific research questions we have sought to address.    
  Another criticism that might be made is that the controversial nature of the events meant 
that interview responses would be subject to social desirability biases. There are several reasons 
why we would argue that these data should be trusted. First, in the data-set, it was clear that 
many interviewees described participating in actions that others might regard as wrong. Second, 
the description of experiences and emotions was broadly consistent across interviewees. Third, 
and perhaps most importantly, these participant accounts help explain the pattern identified in 
the triangulated evidence. Consequently, we have confidence that this data provides an extremely 
valuable insight into the underlying psychology of that riot. 
 Even taking these limitations into account, we argue that the present study provides 
important empirical evidence and theoretical understanding of the dynamics through which riots 
can change and spread. What is evident is that the data relating to the initial transition from anti-
police rioting into systematic collective looting during the 2011 riots observed in Haringey can be 
accounted for if it is understood as an outcome of an identity-based historical intergroup process 
involving specific patterns of policing and relations of power. Moreover, by mapping these 
processes our study has enabled us to develop the ESIM by highlighting how empowerment and 
intergroup interaction can function as an ongoing “positive feedback” process that over time can 
ultimately produce forms of human agency that would not otherwise exist. It is this agency we 
suggest that underpinned a capacity for actors in Haringey to mobilise into new locations and act 
collectively to attack them.     
 We therefore suggest that the present analysis helps to advance theoretical understanding 
of the patterns of spread and change within Haringey during one night of rioting, patterns which 
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are common within waves of riots. However, we do not claim this is a complete account capable 
of explaining the broader conflagration across the next few days. One important question raised, 
but not answered, in the present analysis is the motivation of people joining in with events later 
– as we saw in the cases of people alerted by social media to the events in question. “Contagion”, 
a dominant media representation of such processes of influence and involvement in the 2011 
English riots and at similar events (e.g., Davies, Fry, Wilson, & Bishop, 2013; Slutkin, 2011) 
cannot explain why some people join in and not others. Moreover, the data does suggest that 
some of the looting in Wood Green and Tottenham Hale was enacted by people motivated 
merely by an opportunity to appropriate. However, we would contend that such explanations are 
not sufficient to explain the observed behavioural complexity, particularly as this relates to the 
transition from anti-police to a predominantly “consumerist” riot (cf. Treadwell et al., 2013).  At 
the very least, the data suggests that people participated in both types of collective action, that 
the looting was motivated and legitimised as much by structural issues as it was by consumerism, 
and the latter would not have been possible if the dynamics unlocked through the former had 
not taken place.  
There are other, related, questions. Why for example did the riots subsequently spread 
into the neighbouring borough of Enfield the following day? How does this ESIM analysis of 
the development of agency help understand the patterns and limits of spread across London and 
to other cities (Baudains et al., 2012; Lewis et al, 2011; Newburn, 2016a). The present study 
raises these questions, not answers them. It does, however, provide preliminary foundations for 
understanding how to address these important questions and act as the basis upon which social 
psychology can contribute to the interdisciplinary dialogue necessary to fully understand how 
riots spread and develop.       
  
 33 
References 
 
Akram, S. (2014). Recognizing the 2011 United Kingdom riots as political protest: A theoretical 
framework based on agency, habitus and the preconscious. British Journal of Criminology, 
54, 375-392. doi:10.1093/bjc/azu013 
Baudains, P., Braithwaite, A., & Johnson, S. D. (2012). Spatial patterns in the 2011 London riots. 
Policing, 7, 21-31. doi:10.1093/police/pas049  
Berk, R. (1974). A gaming approach to crowd behaviour. American Sociological Review, 39, 355-373. 
Berk, R., & Aldrich, H. E. (1972). Patterns of vandalism during civil disorders as an indicator of 
selection of targets. American Sociological Review, 37, 533-547. doi: 10.2307/2093449 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology, 3, 77-101. doi:10.1191/1478088706qp063oa 
Davies, T., Fry, H., Wilson, A., & Bishop, R. (2013). A mathematical model of the London riots 
and their policing. Scientific Reports, 3(1303), 1-9. doi: 10.1038/srep01303  
Denzin, N. K. (1970). The research act. Chicago, IL: Aldine,  
Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (1999). The intergroup dynamics of collective empowerment: 
Substantiating the social identity model of crowd behavior. Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations, 2, 381-402. doi:10.1177/1368430299024005 
Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (2000). Collective action and psychological change: The emergence of 
new social identities. British Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 579-604. 
doi:10.1348/014466600164642 
Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (2005). Explaining enduring empowerment: A comparative study of 
collective action and psychological outcomes. European Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 35-
58. doi:10.1002/ejsp.231 
 34 
Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (2009). Collective psychological empowerment as a model of social 
change: Researching crowds and power. Journal of Social Issues, 65, 707-725. 
doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2009.01622.x 
Human Rights and Equalities Commission (2010). Stop and Think: A Critical Review of the Use 
of Stop and Search Powers in England and Wales. Equality and Human Rights 
Commission Published March 2010. 
Hussain, Y., & Bagguley, P. (2009). The Bradford “riot” of 2001: The diversity of action. In D. 
Waddington, F. Jobard, & M. King (Eds.) Rioting in the UK and France: A comparative 
analysis (pp. 71-80). Cullompton, UK: Willan. 
Independent Police Complaints Commission. (2015a). Independent Investigation Final Report: The 
fatal police shooting of Mr Mark Duggan on 4 August 2011. Retrieved from 
https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/investigation_commissioner_r
eports/IPCC-investigation-report-fatal-shooting-of-MD.pdf   
Independent Police Complaints Commission. (2015b). Mark Duggan Investigation Timeline.   
Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/page/mark-duggan-investigation-timeline  
Jefferson, T. (2014). The 2011 English riots: A contexualized, dynamic, grounded exploration. 
Contention, 2, 5-22. doi :10.3167/cont.2014.020202 
Jeffery, B., & Jackson, W. (2012). The Pendleton riot: A political sociology. Criminal Justice 
Matters, 87, 18-20. doi:10.1080/09627251.2012.671000 
Le Bon, G. (2002). The crowd. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications. (Original work published 1895) 
Lewis, P., Newburn, T., Taylor, M., Mcgillivray, C., Greenhill, A., Frayman, H., & Proctor, R. 
(2011). Reading the riots: Investigating England's summer of disorder. The Guardian. 
Retrieved from 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46297/1/Reading%20the%20riots(published).pdf  
Metropolitan Police Service (2012). 4 Days in August: Strategic review into the disorder of August 2011 
(Final Report). Retrieved from https://beta.met.police.uk/globalassets/foi-
 35 
media/priorities_and_how_we_are_doing/corporate/4-days-in-august.-strategic-review-
into-the-disorder-of-august-2011---final-report-march-2012  
Moore, S. (2012) Number of Stop and Searches Halved in Haringey. Tottenham and Wood 
Green Journal. http://www.tottenhamjournal.co.uk/news/crime-
court/number_of_stop_and_searches_halved_in_haringey_1_1469742 
Moran, M., & Waddington, D. (2015). Recent riots in the UK and France: Causes and 
commonalities. Contention: The Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Protest, 2, 57-73.  
Moxon, D. (2011). Consumer culture and the 2011 riots. Sociological Research Online, 16, 19.  
doi:10.5153/sro.2539  
Newburn, T. (2016a). Reflections on why riots don’t happen. Theoretical Criminology, 20, 125-144. 
doi:10.1177/1362480615598829 
Newburn, T. (2016b). The 2011 England riots in European context: A framework for 
understanding the “life-cycle” of riots. European Journal of Criminology, 13, 540-555. 
doi:10.1177/1477370816633726 
Newburn, T. (2017). Criminology (3rd Ed). Abingdon, UK: Routledge. 
Newburn, T., Deacon, R., Diski, B., Cooper, K., Grant, M., & Burch, A. (2016). “The best three 
days of my life”: Pleasure, power and alienation in the 2011 riots. Crime, Media, Culture, 1-
19. doi:10.1177/1741659016667438 
Newburn, T., Diski, R., Cooper, K., Deacon, R., Burch, A., & Grant, M. (2016). “The biggest 
gang”? Police and people in the 2011 England riots. Policing and Society, 1-18. 
doi:10.1080/10439463.2016.1165220 
Newburn, T., Lewis, P., Addley, E., & Taylor, M. (2011). David Cameron, the Queen and the 
rioters’ sense of injustice. Reading the riots: Investigating England’s summer of disorder. London, 
UK: Guardian.  
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action public goods and the theory of groups (Rev. ed.). Cambridge, 
MA:  Harvard University. 
 36 
Potter, J. (1996). Discourse analysis and constructionist approaches: Theoretical background. In 
J. T. E. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of qualitative research methods for psychology and the social 
science (pp. 125 – 140). Leicester, UK: British Psychological Society.  
Reicher, S. D. (1984). The St. Pauls' riot: An explanation of the limits of crowd action in terms of 
a social identity model. European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, 1-21. 
doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420140102 
Reicher, S. D. (1996). “The battle of Westminster”: Developing the social identity model of 
crowd behaviour in order to explain the initiation and development of collective conflict. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 26, 115-134. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0992(199601)26:1<115::AID-EJSP740>3.0.CO;2-Z  
Reicher, S. D. (2001). The psychology of crowd dynamics. In M.A. Hogg & R.S. Tindale (Eds.). 
Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes (pp. 182-207). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Reicher, S., & Stott, C. (2011). Mad mobs and Englishmen?: Myths and realities of the 2011 riots. 
London, UK: Constable & Robinson. 
Slutkin, G. (2011, August 14). Rioting is a disease spread from person to person–the key is to 
stop the infection. The Observer. 
Stott, C. (2011). Crowd dynamics and public order policing. In T. Madensen & J. Knutsson 
(Eds.), Preventing crowd violence. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Stott, C., Adang, O., Livingstone, A., & Schreiber, M. (2007). Variability in the collective 
behaviour of England fans at Euro2004: “Hooliganism”, public order policing and social 
change. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 75-100. doi:10.1002/ejsp.338 
Stott, C., Adang, O., Livingstone, A., & Schreiber, M. (2008). Tackling football hooliganism: A 
quantitative study of public order, policing and crowd psychology. Psychology, Public Policy, 
and Law, 14, 115-141. doi:10.1037/a0013419 
Stott, C., & Drury, J. (2000). Crowds, context and identity: Dynamic categorization processes in 
the “poll tax riot”. Human Relations, 53, 247-273. doi:10.1177/a010563 
 37 
Stott, C., Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (2017). On the role of a social identity analysis in articulating 
structure and collective action: The 2011 riots in Tottenham and Hackney. British Journal 
of Criminology, 57, 964-981. doi:10.1093/bjc/azw036 
Stott, C., Hutchison, P., & Drury, J. (2001). “Hooligans” abroad? Inter-group dynamics, social 
identity and participation in collective “disorder” at the 1998 World Cup Finals. British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 359-384. doi:10.1348/014466601164876   
Stott, C., & Reicher, S. (1998a). Crowd action as intergroup process: Introducing the police 
perspective. European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 509-529. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0992(199807/08)28:4<509::AID-EJSP877>3.3.CO;2-3 
Stott, C., & Reicher, S. (1998b). How conflict escalates: The inter-group dynamics of collective 
football crowd “violence”. Sociology, 32, 353-77. doi:10.1177/0038038598032002007 
Treadwell, J., Briggs, D., Winlow, S., & Hall, S. (2013). Shopocalypse now: Consumer culture and 
the English riots of 2011. British Journal of Criminology, 53, 1-17. doi:10.1093/bjc/azs054 
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the 
social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & McGarty, C. (1994). Self and collective: Cognition 
and social context. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 454-463. 
doi:10.1177/0146167294205002 
Turner, R. H., & Killian, L. M. (1972). Collective behavior. (Second edition). Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Winlow, S., Hall, S., Treadwell, J., & Briggs, D. (2015) Riots and political protest: notes form the post-
political present. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Zimbardo, P. G. (1970). The human choice: Individuation, reason and order versus de-
individuation, impulse and chaos. In W. J. Arnold & D. Levine (Eds.), Nebraska 
symposium on motivation 1969 (pp. 237-307). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska. 
 38 
 
Endnotes 
                                                                  
 
1 The TSG is a specialized unit within the MPS trained to deal with serious incidents of public disorder. A typical TSG unit consists 
of three carriers (vans), 18 constables, and three sergeants reporting to an inspector.  
2 It should be noted that these locations were where fires were initiated. In several cases, a number of residential properties above 
and adjacent to these targets were destroyed by fire. However, as these were not the primary target of the arsonists they are 
considered by this study to be ‘collateral damage’. 
3 A small group of local men and youths armed with bottles, rocks and sticks met on the High Road under the shopping mall 
(Location 25, Figure 3) and proceeded to attack a passing police car on its way to Tottenham. After smashing several shop 
windows and setting fire to two private vehicles on the High Road, they robbed a nearby gaming arcade. The group then threw 
missiles at a passing private vehicle, pushed a cyclist off his bike before assaulting him and, using materials taken from a nearby 
roadworks, attempted to barricade the High Road (Location 23, Figure 3). 
4  Each extract has a suffix which corresponds to a full transcript code and the line numbers in that transcript. When the data is 
made available in the public archives readers will be able to use these codes to locate the specific extract and see it in its broader 
context. 
5 In June 2011, the MPS conducted 1,614 stop-and-searches in Haringey, of these 91.4% did not lead to any arrest (Moore, 
2012). Such activities were likely to have been highly racialised. In London in 2009, 210 out of 1,000 Black people were stopped 
compared to 76 out of 1,000 for whites (Human Rights and Equalities Commission, 2010). 
6 … indicates a pause in the dialogue. 
7 [ ] indicates material removed for brevity. 
